This afternoon, I attended a lecture in Jerusalem by the historian Michael Oren on U.S.-Israel relations, intended for foreign journalists on the eve of President Bush's visit here this week. He covered a whole gamut of issues - the historical roots of U.S. support for Israel, the politics of Annapolis and this visit in Israel and the U.S., the war in Iraq, the threat of Iran. Amidst the useful background information, he had many insightful points, and I will add a few thoughts, that are worth noting.

The second Winograd Report on the 2006 Lebanon War is to be released soon, after many politically-motivated delays, and the power brokers and media in Israel are all gearing up for the expected pressure on Olmert to resign. Oren reminded the audience of the historical precedents: Golda Meir and Menachem Begin both resigned after commissions found fault in their handling of the Yom Kippur and Lebanon Wars, respectively, even though the two leaders were not personally implicated for responsibility. Olmert, on the other hand, is expected to be personally implicated, but his skills at political maneuvering, and his stable coalition - currently held up by the right but able to shift easily to the left if necessary - make his departure far from a sure bet. (Former PM Netanyahu, recently returned to leadership of the Likud party, has been quietly biding his time in the opposition, waiting for Winograd to seize the role of inevitable heir. Contrary to the usual protocol, Bush will not be meeting with the opposition on this trip.)

Regarding the Palestinians, the perspective Oren presented is obvious in terms of the facts but ambiguous in terms of what should be done about it. The PA (i.e. Fatah) has done very little to crack down seriously on terror. Contrary to its claims, Fatah's own terrorist wings continue to operate. (While 2007 was the best year since Israel's founding in 1948 in terms of the number of Israelis killed by terrorism, the number of attempted attacks has not diminished; rather the success of thwarting them has increased.) Fatah recently arrested some 250 Hamas members, made a big show for the press, then released them all. Hamas continues to fire rockets from Gaza to Sderot. Most importantly, both Hamas and Fatah view Palestinian statehood - the "two-state solution" - as only a means to the ultimate end of the "one-state solution," and not a Jewish one at that. They make no bones about it in their statements, either. Where Israeli policy analysts differ is how to respond: refuse to negotiate until Fatah accepts the legitimacy of a permanent, sovereign Jewish state, or treat the fundamentalist Fatah objective the same as that of far-right Israelis - unattainable and therefore irrelevant? I think the consensus Ariel Sharon sealed in the country was around the demographic urgency of separation: there needs to be a separate, sovereign Palestinian entity simply to preserve the democratic and Jewish principles of Israel's existence. But this plays into the hands of the Palestinians no matter how Israel handles it - because negotiations can lead to an [interim] two-state arrangement but non-negotiation will lead to a call for Palestinian voting rights - so this is a thorny problem that isn't going away and deserves a lot more attention.

Oren spoke a great deal about Iran. Regarding its nuclear program, he opined in the Q&A after the lecture that the momentum of the program makes it ultimately unstoppable, even if it is currently suspended, and that Israel will never let Iran become a nuclear power - meaning war, sooner or later, is almost inevitable. (Which confirms to me that the only strategy with any reasonable probability of deterring Iranian nuclear development - namely, legitimacy for Iran through a normalization of ties with the U.S. - needs to be pursued urgently and earnestly by the next president if not the current one.)

Today in the papers we read about the Revolutionary Guards testing the anti-swarming defenses of the U.S. Navy, apparently dumping white boxes in the paths of the ships and threatening over the radio to blow them up. The fast boats turned away just before they were fired upon, the ships dodged the boxes, the Iranians gained some tactical intel, and we are reminded that U.S.-Iran tensions are a powder keg that could explode at any moment.

The Israeli (and Saudi) position on the NIE was that it is irrelevant: even if Iran did stop its weapons program, it already has the missile delivery systems and will soon have the fissile material for which a restarted weapons program would quickly complete the puzzle. It does seem that the press latched too obsessively on the single point of suspension, at the expense of all other strategically important implications. For example, the NIE claimed that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003, presumably because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This means that the U.S. was building up to invade Iraq - a country with no active nuclear weapons program - all the while Iran had an active program. The historical absurdity of this should not be forgotten. In the present, the Israeli and Saudi reactions to the NIE were very different: Israel called it a betrayal and revived (in its national discussion) the possibility of unilateral action; Saudi Arabia decided the U.S. wasn't going to save the day and placated Iran with a visit by Ahmedinejad.

Contrary to the images of threat and fundamentalism, NBC's Richard Engel has a video report showing another side of Iran. If you mind your own business (i.e. don't get involved in politics), you can live a very good life there, probably better than in many other countries in the region. (I'd take living in Iran over Saudi Arabia any day.) Its degree of political tyranny is probably comparable to China and dozens of other countries the U.S. has normal relations with. If there is any chance for a more moderate government rising in Iran, starting a war now would surely kill it.

Finally, two notes about Egypt. First, Oren pointed out the unenviable strategic position the Egyptian government is in: domestically challenged by a strong extremist opposition, no longer a dominant regional player, playing a double game with Israel and Hamas, under pressure from the U.S. Egypt recently lashed out at Israel diplomatically for presenting evidence to Congress that Egyptian troops were involved in arms smuggling into Gaza. This brings me to the second point: an IDF soldier serving on the Israeli-Egyptian border told me something very interesting recently: the troops Egypt sends to that border (considered a distant outpost with little danger of war and a political nuisance) are ex-cons who get paroled early in exchange for service there. They're often not even armed. It's no wonder, then, that some of them help Hamas smuggle arms into Gaza.

Interestingly, whether the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was good or bad remains an open question. That it has strengthened Hamas and made Israel look weak to its enemies is undisputed, and the Right considers the consequences of withdrawal a disaster and a vindication of its fierce opposition at the time. But for the IDF troops who would be inside Gaza being attacked daily if Israel still occupied the territory, not being directly in the fire anymore is a blessing. It might not last long, however: at some point one of the Kassam rockets will kill people, or will hit a more central location, and then the IDF will have to re-invade Gaza - now fortified with Hezbollah-style bunkers and armed to the teeth with new, more advanced weapons - and the casualties will be tremendous on both sides.